



To: Financial Institutions
From: The Supervisory Authority
Dated: 13 December 2019

ADVISORY

on Jurisdictions identified with AML/CFT Deficiencies

TAKE NOTICE, this ADVISORY is issued pursuant to Regulation 6(1a) of the Money Laundering (Prevention) Regulations 2007¹, and sets out actions to be implemented and countermeasures to be taken relating to foreign jurisdictions with AML/CFT weaknesses that do not or insufficiently apply AML/CFT² international standards³.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS are required to PAY ATTENTION to the following:

A. The “FATF Public Statement” dated 18 October 2019 relating to⁴:

I. Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call for countermeasures⁵.

Purpose: To protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD⁶ proliferation financing risks emanating from the following jurisdiction:

- **DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)**

¹ Amended by section 7(6) of the Money Laundering (Prevention) (Amendment) Regulations 2009

² AML/CFT: anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing

³ Reg. “6(1a) (1) [A financial institution] must pay special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons from or in countries which [the financial institution] knows or has reason to believe insufficiently apply international standards against money laundering or the financing of terrorism.

(2) If the Supervisory Authority notifies [a financial institution] that a country has weaknesses in its AML/CFT systems, then [the financial institution] must pay special attention to business relationships and transactions from or in that country.

(1b) Where transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, [the financial institution] should examine as far as possible the background and purpose of such transactions, and written findings should be kept as a financial transaction document.

(1c) [A financial institution] should adhere to any countermeasures that the Supervisory Authority or the regulator advises should be implemented.”

⁴ See copy of the Public Statement attached.

⁵ Section 12B of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 [amended by section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2017] makes it an offence to be involved in or to finance the development of weapons of mass destruction.

⁶ WMD: weapons of mass destruction

DPRK has failed to address the significant deficiencies in its AML /CFT regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of international financial system.

DPRK has been urged by the FATF to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies.

DPRK has raised serious FATF concerns regarding the threat posed with respect to its illicit activities related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its financing.

Countermeasures: Financial institutions are to give special attention to business relations and transactions with the DPRK. This includes DPRK companies, financial institutions and those acting on their behalf.

Financial institutions should also be alert to the possibility of transactions relating to vessels and shipping that may involve DPRK, which are a major means of circumventing sanctions. Financial institutions should be alert to transactions relating to purchasing, insuring, providing crewing services to such vessels or in relation to vessels carrying products from or to the DPRK. It should be ascertained if any vessel, including Antigua and Barbudan registered vessels, are or may be concerned with such transactions.

Enhanced due diligence in relation to DPRK entities should include application of stringent client identification procedures; application of stringent beneficial owner identification before business relationship is established; enhanced systematic reporting of financial transactions; limiting business relations or financial transactions with DPRK entities; no reliance on third parties located or based in DPRK concerned with conducting elements of the CDD process;

Financial institutions should have a clear understanding of the purpose of any transactions involving such entities and be satisfied to a very high degree after enhanced scrutiny of their legitimacy.

II. Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call for Enhanced Due Diligence –

Purpose: To implement measures proportionate to the risks of ML/FT arising from the following jurisdiction:

- **IRAN**

Countermeasures: suspension of countermeasures continued.

Iran remains a risk for the financing of terrorism, which poses a threat to the international financial system.

As of October 2019, the FATF noted Iran still has not completed the following outstanding items for its AML/CFT regime:

- 1) **the Bills to ratify the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions have been passed but are not yet in force; they will only be reviewed by the FATF when brought into force;**
- 2) **adequately criminalising terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”;**
- 3) **identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;**

- 4) **ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime;**
- 5) **clarifying that the submission of STRs for attempted TF-related transactions are covered under Iran’s legal framework;**
- 6) **demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers;**
- 7) **ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance;**
- 8) **ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information;**

Financial institutions are required to continue to apply enhanced due diligence with respect to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons from Iran, including (1) obtaining information on the reasons for intended transactions, and (2) conducting enhanced monitoring of business relationships, by increasing the number and timing of controls applied, and selecting patterns of transactions that need further examination.

III. Changes to the list

- none

Supervisory Authority guidance regarding jurisdictions listed in section A above — It is an offence in Antigua and Barbuda to engage in financial transactions related to the proliferation of WMD. Where a financial institution is unable to satisfy itself that a transaction is not related to proliferation of WMD then the transaction should not be carried out. Financial institutions should review the Appendix to the MLFT Guidelines titled “Indicators of Possible Proliferation Financing”, issued by the Supervisory Authority on 12 December 2017.

B. The FATF Statement on Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance dated 18 October 2019⁷:

Purpose: To identify to financial institutions jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies for which they have developed an action plan with the FATF, and have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies.

IV. Jurisdictions identified by the FATF as having AML/CFT strategic deficiencies (see additional details in the FATF Advisory) –

- The Bahamas
- Botswana
- Cambodia
- Ghana
- Iceland
- Mongolia

⁷ See Annex for copy of statement on Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance attached.

- Pakistan
- Panama
- Syria
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

V. **Changes to the list**

Jurisdictions no longer subject to the FATF's on-going global AML/CFT compliance process:

- Ethiopia
- Sri Lanka
- Tunisia

C. **The CFATF Public Statement made at Plenary on 27 November 2019**


VI. **Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies**

The CFATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with the following jurisdiction:

- Sint Maarten

The CFATF has expressed concern about Sint Maarten's failure to address remaining deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime after the High Level Mission that visited the jurisdiction on 24 August 2018 and concern of the Plenary requirement to overcome such deficiencies by February 2019, which has not been achieved as verified by the Plenaries of May and November 2019.

The CFATF Plenary has urged Sint Maarten to immediately address the deficiencies, including bringing necessary outstanding legislation into force and effect. In the event of failure to act on the requirement the CFATF may call on its members to apply countermeasures.



.....
 Lt. Col. Edward Croft
 Supervisory Authority
 under the Money Laundering
 (Prevention) Act 1996

ANNEX

FATF Public Statement of 18 October 2019

**FATF Statement on Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance of 18
October 2019**

CFATF Public Statement of 27 November 2019

Public Statement - October 2019

 Send  Print  Tweet

Paris, 18 October 2019 - The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identifies jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK's illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/FT/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions

should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply, in line with Recommendation 19: 1) increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; 2) enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and 3) increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Iran

In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran's high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan.

In November 2017, Iran established a cash declaration regime. In August 2018, Iran has enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and in January 2019, Iran has also enacted amendments to its Anti-Money Laundering Act. The FATF recognises the progress of these legislative efforts. The bills to ratify the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions have passed Parliament, but are not yet in force. As with any country, the FATF can only consider fully enacted legislation. Once the remaining legislation comes fully into force, the FATF will review this alongside the enacted legislation to determine whether the measures contained therein address Iran's Action Plan, in line with the FATF standards.

Iran's action plan expired in January 2018. In October 2019, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups "attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism"; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) clarifying that the submission of STRs for attempted TF-related transactions are covered under Iran's legal framework; (5) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed

money/value transfer service providers; (6) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (7) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

The FATF decided in June 2019 to call upon its members and urge all jurisdictions to require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran. In line with the June 2019 Public Statement, the FATF decided this week to call upon its members and urge all jurisdictions to introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

If before February 2020, Iran does not enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, then the FATF will fully lift the suspension of counter-measures and call on its members and urge all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with recommendation 19¹.

While acknowledging that Iran has recently adopted the AML-CFT bylaw, which the FATF has not yet reviewed, the FATF expresses its disappointment that the Action Plan remains outstanding. The FATF expects Iran to proceed swiftly in the reform path to ensure that it addresses all of the remaining items by completing and implementing the necessary AML/CFT reforms.

Iran will remain on the FATF Public Statement until the full Action Plan has been completed. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system. The FATF, therefore, calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to continue to advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence with respect to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons from Iran, consistent with FATF Recommendation 19, including: (1) obtaining information on the reasons for intended transactions; and (2) conducting enhanced monitoring of business relationships, by increasing the number and timing of controls applied, and selecting patterns of transactions that need further examination.

¹Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.

[The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19](#) specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.

More on:

- [Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process, 18 October 2019](#)
- [Outcomes FATF Plenary, Paris, 18 October 2019](#)

← High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions

Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process - 18 October 2019

 Send
  Print
  Tweet

Paris, France, 18 October 2019 - As part of its ongoing review of compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identifies the following jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies for which they have developed an action plan with the FATF. While the situations differ among each jurisdiction, each jurisdiction has provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies. The FATF welcomes these commitments.

A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF. The FATF continues to identify additional jurisdictions, on an ongoing basis, that pose a risk to the international financial system.

The FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) will continue to work with the jurisdictions noted below and to report on the progress made in addressing the identified deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete the implementation of action plans expeditiously and within the proposed timeframes. The FATF will closely monitor the implementation of these action plans. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members to take into account the information presented below in its risk analysis.

Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies	Jurisdictions no longer subject to monitoring
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Bahamas Botswana Cambodia Ghana Iceland Mongolia Pakistan Panama Syria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ethiopia Sri Lanka Tunisia

Trinidad and Tobago

Yemen

Zimbabwe

The Bahamas

Since October 2018, when The Bahamas made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, The Bahamas has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. These include instituting a protocol and case management system to further enhance international cooperation; initiating risk-based supervision of non-bank financial institutions; and further implementing the recent Beneficial Ownership Law to ensure the timely access to adequate, accurate, and current basic and beneficial ownership information. The Bahamas should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that authorities are investigating and prosecuting all types of money laundering, including complex ML cases, stand-alone money laundering, and cases involving proceeds of foreign offences, including foreign tax crimes; and (2) increasing the identification, tracing and freezing or restraining of assets and to present cases linked with foreign offences and stand-alone ML cases.

Botswana

Since October 2018, when Botswana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Botswana has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by adopting risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manuals for financial sector supervisors and implementing an electronic STR filing system among FIs and certain types of DNFBPs. Botswana should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) assessing the risks associated with legal persons, legal arrangements, and NPOs, and developing and implementing a risk-based comprehensive national AML/CFT strategy; (2) developing and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manuals; (3) improving its analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU, and enhancing the use of financial intelligence among the relevant law enforcement agencies; (4) developing and implementing CFT strategy, and ensuring the TF investigation capacity of the law enforcement agencies; (5) ensuring the implementation without delay of targeted financial sanctions measures related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing, and (6) applying a risk-based approach to monitoring non-profit organisations..

Cambodia

Since February 2019, when Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Cambodia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by initiating off-site and on-site supervision of the real estate and casino sectors. Cambodia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) providing a broad legal basis for MLA and conducting relevant training to LEAs; (2) implementing risk-based supervision for real estate and casinos; (3) implementing the risk-based supervision to banks, including through prompt, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement actions, as appropriate; (4) amending the AML/CFT Law to address the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (5) conducting sector-specific outreach to casinos, real-estate and MVTs providers; (6) increasing its FIU resources; enhancing its analysis of STRs; and increasing disseminations to LEAs; (7) increasing domestic coordination and cooperation to enhance ML investigations; (8) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; and providing targeted proceeds of crime confiscation training to all LEAs; (9) demonstrating an increase in the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value; (10) establishing the legal framework to implement UN sanctions related to PF TFS, demonstrating that implementation is occurring and enhancing the understanding of sanctions evasion.

Ghana

Since October 2018, when Ghana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Ghana has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by conducting a risk assessment on legal persons, and developing a framework for adequate and effective investigation and prosecution of TF. Ghana should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing a comprehensive national AML/CFT Policy based on the risks identified in the NRA, including measures to mitigate ML/TF risks associated with the legal persons; (2) improving risk-based supervision, by enhancing the capacity of the regulators and the awareness of the private sector; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) ensuring that the FIU is focusing its activities the risks identified in the NRA, and adequately resourced; and (5) applying a risk-based approach for monitoring non-profit organisations.

Iceland

In October 2019, Iceland made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2017, Iceland has made progress on a number of recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including carrying out a second national risk assessment, comprehensive outreach to deepen the understanding of relevant risks across sectors, enhancing risk based supervision in both the financial

and DNFBP sector and significantly strengthening the capacities of investigation and law enforcement authorities. Iceland will work to implement its action plan, by: (1) ensuring the access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal persons by competent authorities in a timely manner; (2) introducing an automated system for STR filing and enhancing the FIU's capacity in its strategic and operational analysis; (3) ensuring implementation of the TFS requirements among FIs and DNFBPs through effective supervision, and enabling effective oversight and monitoring of NPOs with adequate resources and in line with the identified TF risks. FATF noted that Iceland had already pro-actively taken steps to address these issues before the Action Plan's formal adoption by FATF. However, the FATF could not yet fully review these due to their very recent nature.

Mongolia

In October 2019, Mongolia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2017, Mongolia has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by enhancing its ML and TF risk understanding, and introducing a comprehensive institutional framework to give effect to PF TFS obligations, and enhancing its TF TFS legal framework through legislative measures and guidance. Mongolia will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) improving sectoral ML/TF risk understanding by DNFBP supervisors, applying a risk-based approach to supervision and applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) demonstrating increased investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML activity in line with identified risks; (3) demonstrating further seizure and confiscation of falsely/non-declared currency and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (4) demonstrating cooperation and coordination between authorities to prevent sanctions evasion; and monitoring compliance by FIs and DNFBPs with their PF-related TFS obligations, including the application of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Pakistan

Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan has made progress towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including the recent development of its ML/TF risk assessment. At the October 2019 plenary, Pakistan reiterated its political commitment to completing its action plan and implementing AML/CFT reforms. Pakistan should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately demonstrating its proper understanding of the TF risks posed by the terrorist groups, and conducting supervision on a risk-sensitive basis; (2) demonstrating that remedial actions and sanctions are applied in cases of AML/CFT violations, and that these actions have an effect on AML/CFT

compliance by financial institutions; (3) demonstrating that competent authorities are cooperating and taking action to identify and take enforcement action against illegal money or value transfer services (MVTs); (4) demonstrating that authorities are identifying cash couriers and enforcing controls on illicit movement of currency; (5) improving inter-agency coordination including between provincial and federal authorities on combating TF risks; (6) demonstrating that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are identifying and investigating the widest range of TF activity and that TF investigations and prosecutions target designated persons and entities, and those acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons or entities; (7) demonstrating that TF prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and enhancing the capacity and support for prosecutors and the judiciary; and (8) demonstrating effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions (supported by a comprehensive legal obligation) against all 1267 and 1373 designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf, including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets (movable and immovable), and prohibiting access to funds and financial services; (9) demonstrating enforcement against TFS violations including administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases; (10) demonstrating that facilities and services owned or controlled by designated person are deprived of their resources and the usage of the resources.

All deadlines in the action plan have now expired. While noting recent improvements, the FATF again expresses serious concerns with the overall lack of progress by Pakistan to address its TF risks, including remaining deficiencies in demonstrating a sufficient understanding of Pakistan's transnational TF risks, and more broadly, Pakistan's failure to complete its action plan in line with the agreed timelines and in light of the TF risks emanating from the jurisdiction. To date, Pakistan has only largely addressed five of 27 action items, with varying levels of progress made on the rest of the action plan. The FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by February 2020. Otherwise, should significant and sustainable progress not be made across the full range of its action plan by the next Plenary, the FATF will take action, which could include the FATF calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to advise their FIs to give special attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan.

Panama

Since June 2019, when Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Panama has taken initial steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by drafting sectoral risk assessments for the corporate and DNFBP sectors and free trade zones. Panama should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its understanding of the national and sectoral ML/TF risk and informing findings to its national policies to mitigate the identified risks; (2) proactively taking action to identify unlicensed money remitters, applying a risk-

based approach to supervision of the DNFBP sector and ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions against AML/CFT violations; (3) ensuring adequate verification and update of beneficial ownership information by obliged entities, establishing an effective mechanism to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors, and ensuring timely access to adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information; and (4) ensuring effective use of FIU products for ML investigations, demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and to provide constructive and timely international cooperation with such offence, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas identified in the NRA and MER.

Syria

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Trinidad and Tobago

In November 2017, Trinidad and Tobago made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. The FATF has made the initial determination that Trinidad and Tobago has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of Trinidad and Tobago's AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Specifically, Trinidad and Tobago has made the following key reforms: (1) adopting and implementing the relevant measures to enhance international cooperation; (2) addressing measures for transparency and beneficial ownership; (3) completing the legislative efforts to enhance the processing of ML charges before the courts; (4) taking measures to enhance tracing and confiscation of criminal assets; (5) enforcing TF measures and adopting appropriate measures for NPOs; (6) enacting the necessary amendments related to targeted financial sanctions; and (7) developing, adopting, and implementing the necessary framework to counter proliferation financing.

Yemen

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Zimbabwe

In October 2019, Zimbabwe made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2016, Zimbabwe has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including establishing a national coordination and cooperation structure on AML/CFT issues, amending the AML/CFT legal framework to apply a risk-based approach to supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, widening the scope of disseminating financial intelligence, and establishing an asset forfeiture unit within the National Prosecuting Authority. Zimbabwe will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) improving understanding of the key ML/TF risks among the relevant stakeholders and implementing the national AML/CFT policy base on the identified risks; (2) implementing risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs including through capacity building among the supervisory authority; (3) ensuring development of adequate risk mitigation measures among FIs and DNFBPs, including by applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to breaches; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework and mechanism to collect and maintain accurate and updated beneficial ownership information for legal persons and arrangements, and ensure timely assess by the competent authorities; and (5) addressing remaining gaps in the TF- and PF-related TFS frameworks and demonstrating implementation.

Jurisdictions No Longer Subject to the FATF's On-Going Global AML/CFT Compliance Process

Ethiopia

The FATF welcomes Ethiopia's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Ethiopia has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the

FATF identified in February 2017. Ethiopia is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's monitoring process under its ongoing global AML/CFT compliance process. Ethiopia will continue to work with ESAAMLG to improve further its AML/CFT regime.

Sri Lanka

The FATF welcomes Sri Lanka's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Sri Lanka has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in November 2017. Sri Lanka is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's monitoring process under its ongoing global AML/CFT compliance process. Sri Lanka will continue to work with APG to improve further its AML/CFT regime.

Tunisia

The FATF welcomes Tunisia's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Tunisia has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in November 2017. Tunisia is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's monitoring process under its ongoing global AML/CFT compliance process. Tunisia will continue to work with MENAFATF to improve further its AML/CFT regime.

More on:

- [Public Statement, 18 October 2019](#)
- [Outcomes FATF Plenary, Paris, 18 October 2019](#)

[← High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions](#)

CFATF Public Statement on Sint Maarten at L Plenary St. Johns, Antigua and Barbuda, November 27th,2019



The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) is an organisation of twenty-five jurisdictions of the Caribbean Basin Region, which have agreed to implement the international standards on Combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (The FATF Recommendations). In order to protect the international financial system from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the CFATF identifies jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that has not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies. The CFATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with the jurisdiction, as described below.

Sint Maarten


The CFATF recognizes the progress made by Sint Maarten to date in addressing the deficiencies identified in its Mutual Evaluation Report. However, the CFATF is concerned by Sint Maarten's failure to address remaining deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime after the High-Level Mission that visited the country on August 24th, 2018 and the Plenary's requirement to overcome such deficiencies by February 2019, which has not been achieved as verified at the CFATF May and November 2019 Plenary meetings.

The CFATF urges Sint Maarten to immediately address its AML/CFT deficiencies including bringing the necessary outstanding legislation into force and effect. In the event of failure to act on this requirement, the CFATF may call its member jurisdiction to apply countermeasures on the country as set out in the procedures for the third stage of Enhanced Follow-Up, which entails the application of Rec. 21 of the FATF Standards of 2003, in order to protect their financial systems from the ongoing ML and TF risks emanating from Sint Maarten.

The CFATF LI Plenary will review if additional progress has been made by Sint Maarten.

Recent Public Statement

Public Statement and Notice of exiting the Follow-up process May 2018

 (/cfatf-documents/cfatf-public-statements/9679-public-statement-and-notice-of-exiting-the-follow-up-process-may-2018) (/cfatf-documents/cfatf-public-statements/9679-public-statement-and-notice-of-exiting-the-follow-up-process-may-2018)

Popular



[Home \(/index.php\)](#) | [Contact us \(/index.php/home/contact-us\)](#) | [Sitemap \(/index.php/home/sitemap\)](#) | [Terms and Conditions \(/index.php/home/cfatf-overview/terms-and-conditions\)](#) |

Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). All rights reserved.

Copyright © 1992-2019

CFATF Secretariat
21st Floor, Nicholas Tower, 63-65 Independence Square, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago
Tel: 1 (868) 623-9667/4888
Fax: 1 (868) 624-1297
Email: cfatf@cfatf.org
<https://www.cfatf-gafic.org>
(<https://www.cfatf-gafic.org/>)

Bootstrap (<http://twitter.github.io/bootstrap/>) is a front-end framework of Twitter, Inc. Code licensed under MIT License. (<https://github.com/twbs/bootstrap/blob/master/LICENSE>)

Font Awesome (<http://fontawesome.github.io/Font-Awesome/>) font licensed under SIL OFL 1.1 (<http://scripts.sil.org/OFL>).